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ENVIRONMENTAL SURvEY OF WTO DISPUTE PANEL
RESOLUTION PANEL DECISIONS SINCE 1995: "TRADE AT ALL
COSTS?"*
CRAIG A.A. DIXONt
Are we, as a global community, really serious about taking care of
the environment? In an age where modem society has engineered some of
the most remarkable breakthroughs in business, law, and technology, the
environmental protection movement still struggles. The movement has
been, in a sense, treated like an impudent child-better seen and not heard.
Politicians and business leaders alike stress the need for environmental
responsibility, but looking at the landscape, it is hard to separate lip-
service from true commitment. Environmental groups have been
energized in order to hold those entities that are detrimentally effecting the
environment accountable for their actions. One of the global
organizations that has a direct and indirect hand in affecting environmental
protection, the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), has lately been a
target for criticism in environmental and labor circles. Recently, more
than six hundred people were arrested in connection with the WTO
demonstrations that occurred when the WTO met in Seattle, Washington
from November 30, 1999 to December 3, 1999.1
The purpose of this Note is to examine all of the major
environmental decisions handed down by the Dispute Resolution Panel of
the WTO and evaluate the organization's commitment to the environment.
In doing so, section I gives a brief overview of the WTO and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 2 discussing the early stages of
environmental policy under each. Section II explores the four major
environmental decisions handed down by the WTO, namely: Standards
Lisa K. Seilheimer, Note, The SPS Agreement Applied: The WTO Hormone Beef Case,
4 ENVTL. LAW. 537, 576 (1998) (quoting Colin Hines, Globalization: Big Stick Politics,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 8, 1997, at 4).
t Mr. Dixon received his B.B.A. in Finance from the College of William and Mary in
1997, and expects to receive his J.D. in May 2000 from the College of William and Mary
School of Law.
1 See WTO Foes Celebrate Trial as Dismissed, SEATrLE TIMES, January 25, 2000, at B2.2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,3 EC Measures Con.cerning
Meat and Meat Products,4 Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of
Salmon,5 and United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products.6 Section III discusses common themes or trends found
in the four cases in order to shed light on where the WTO is with respect
to environmental policy, hopefully answering the question asked by
environmentalists, businesspeople, and governments alike: whereare we
now? Section IV concludes this Note by putting forth a call for the WTO
to better balance environmental concerns with its free trade agenda, and
recommends that the United States and other environmentally aware
nations should consider ignoring WTO mandates until that organization
does more than merely give lipservice to environmental protection.
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
WITH RESPECT TO TRADE
A. Creation of the WTO
The WTO identifies itself as being "the only international body
dealing with the rules of trade between nations."7 The WTO grew out of
the economic ruin of World War II, which according to many was the
result of building tension among nations caused by trade protectionism.
8
After World War II, certain nations reached the consensus that some type
of framework should be established in order to facilitate international
cooperation. 9 One component of that framework was an organization to
reduce trade barriers, and, after several intermediate steps, the Havana
3 World Trade Organization, Panel Report: United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274 (1996) [hereinafter
Reformulated-Gasoline].
4 World Trade Organization, Panel Report: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), 2 Int'l Trade L. Rep., No. 4, at 746, Aug. 18, 1997 [hereinafter
Hormone Bee]].
5 World Trade Organization, Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WT/DS18/R, June 12, 1998, Doc. 98-243 (WTO), available in Westlaw at 1998 WL
330843 [hereinafter Australia-Salmon].
6 World Trade Organization, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 37 I.L.M. 832 (1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle].
7 World Trade Organization, What is the World Trade Organization? (visited Mar. 8,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/factsl.htm#strong>. The WTO website gives an
overview of the WTO's purpose and goals. It gives the WTO's perspective with respect
to trade and news updates of current matters of interest.
8 See, e.g., DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATT 243 (1994).
9 See id. at 244.
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Charter was written in 1947, and signed by fifty-three nations on March
24, 1998.10 This Charter was supposed to provide a comprehensive
system for international trade practices." However, because the Havana
Charter had to go through the lengthy process of ratification by member
countries, the GATT was adopted as a provisionary measure in 1947.12
Due to its "temporary" nature, the GATT was vague and provided no
"enforcement mechanisms, no codified rules," or other formal procedures
for its operation.' 3 Ironically, the political climate changed in both the
United States and other member nations, making the GATT the only
international framework to combat protectionism in international trade
until 1995.14
Although the GATT lacked formal mechanisms, several accords
were developed under it to more effectively guide international trade
policy. 15 More importantly, the "Uruguay Round,'16" signed by over 117
countries in 1994, provided the real roots for the World Trade
Organization.' 7 The Uruguay Round provided the "stick" to enforce the
"carrot" provided by the GATT and other agreements on trade.' 8
The WTO has three aims.' 9 The first goal is to help trade flow as
freely as possible.20 According to the WTO, this means not only removing
obstacles to trade, but also "ensuring that individuals, companies and
governments know what the trade rules are around the world, and [have]
confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy." 21 The second
aim of the WTO is to serve as a forum for trade negotiations.22
This provides for open lines of communication, better enabling the
international community to work together for global benefit. The last and
10 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, U.N. Doc. E/C.2/78 (1948).
"See ESTY, supra note 8, at 244.
2 See id. at 245.
13 Id. The GATT was originally intended as a temporary measure committing members
to some basic principles of international trade. The proposal for an International Trade
Organization ("ITO") (precursor to the WTO), necessitated ratification by member
countries in order to be legally binding. Lawmakers in the United States were reluctant
to ratify it, however, because of concerns with sovereignty issues. See id. at 244.
14 See id. at 245.
"5 See id. at 247-48.
16 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
7 See id.
18 See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 87 (1996).
'9 See World Trade Organization, supra note 7.
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 See id.
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most important objective of the WTO is dispute settlement. 23 Due to the
conflicting interests that are often at the center of trade disputes, having a
neutral procedure, based on an agreed-upon legal foundation, makes
peaceful resolution possible.
24
"Whereas GATT had mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO
and its agreements [also] cover trade in services, and in traded inventions,
creations and designs," otherwise known as "intellectual property."25 The
WTO's neutral framework is also beneficial in circumstances where only
some of the parties in a dispute are signatories to an agreement. 26 Without
the WTO, such situations would be much more difficult to resolve, if not
impossible.
Aside from the WTO itself, another offshoot of the Uruguay
Round was the decision to formulate a more international approach to
environmental problems. 27 The end result was the WTO Committee on
Trade and Environment ("CTE"). 28 The parameters of CTE's concern are
two-fold. One is that "policy coordination" be limited to trade and those
trade-related aspects of environmental policies that may result in
significant trade effects for its members.29 This restricted focus was
designed to keep the CTE out of the way of other, better equipped bodies
and agencies responsible for developing, implementing, and monitoring
global standards and policies on the environment.
30
The second parameter is that if problems of policy
coordination to protect the environment and promote
sustainable development are identified through the CTE's
work, steps taken to resolve them must uphold and
safeguard the principles of the multilateral trading system
which governments spent seven years strengthening and
improving through the Uruguay Round negotiations.
3
'
Many in environmental circles argue that the policies established
by the second parameter of the CTE effectively nullifies any protective
23 See id.
24 See World Trade Organization, supra note 7.
25 Id.
26 See id.
27 See World Trade Organization, Trade and Environment in the WTO (visited Mar. 8,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/environl/marrakes.htm>.
28 See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 id.
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environmental measures that might have some negative trade implications
regardless of their success in protecting environmental concerns. 32
However, WTO literature plainly states that the goal of the Committee is
to "identify the relationships between trade ad environmental measures in
order to promote sustainable development, and to make recommendations
on whether any modifications to the provisions of the multilateral trading
system are required. 33
B. GATTXX
The GATT was founded on the premise that limiting
discriminatory trade practices increases global welfare.34  However, the
GATT's environmental, or "green exception" 35 does recognize the ability
of a country to place other concerns ahead of obligations under the
GATT.36 Article XX states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised.
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
32 See, e.g., Andrew L. Strauss, The Case for Utilizing the WTO As a Forum for Global
Environmental Regulation, 3 WIDENER LAW SYMP. J., 309, 318 (1998). Commentators
argue that Developing Nations have a stranglehold on the CTE and use the relatively
small size of the committee to dominate the environmental position of the WTO as a
whole, thereby precluding any "significant environmental initiatives." Id.
33 World Trade Organization, supra note 27.
34 See Mark Edward Foster, Trade and Environment: Making Room For Environmental
Trade Measures Within the GA7T, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 393, 421-22 (1998).
31 Id. at 425.
36 See id.
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consumption. 37
"Articles XX(b) and (g) are commonly considered the 'green' exceptions
of the GATT because they offer the most hope for the environmental
policies of high-level states. 38
Despite Article XX's existence, its importance in the multilateral
trading system is not clear from the language. Given the current system of
trade regulation, Article XX is not worth the paper that it is written on if
the WTO and its proponents fail to both embrace it, and give it strength.
At one point, many environmental interests felt that when in
conflict with the liberalization of international trade, Article XX was given
no effect.3 9 This thinking was largely the result of the U.S. brief "United
States-Restrictions on Importation of Tuna," more commonly known as
the Tuna-Dolphin dispute." Although Tuna-Dolphin predates the WTO,
current treatment of Article XX finds root in this case.
Tuna-Dolphin centered on a U.S. embargo on all tuna caught using
purse-seine nets, which are known to ensnare dolphins that swim above
42the tuna. Mexico's challenge was twofold: first, that the U.S. ban
violated the GATT prohibition on import restrictions,43 and second, that
the ban was an attempt by the United States to protect its domestic tuna
industry.44 The panel ruled in favor of Mexico on the grounds that the
embargo was inconsistent with GATT obligations because the use of trade
measures to protect the environment outside a nation's sovereign territory
was not permitted under the Agreement, and because the ban was not
"necessary" to save dolphins.4 5 One commentator felt that the Tuna-
Dolphin I decision "jeopardize[d] the future efficacy of international
37 GATT Art. XX. See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 33, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1181 (1994) (listing the Schedules of Specific
Commitments in Article XX).
38 Foster, supra note 34, at 426.
39 See, e.g., Janet McDonald, Trade and the Environment: Greening the GATT.
Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23
ENVTL. L. 397, 438 (1992).
40 Panel Report: United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1598 (1992) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin].
41 See discussion infra Part II. This dispute, between the U.S. and its trading partners,
had two phases. Mexico brought Tuna-Dolphin I and the European Union brought Tuna-
Dolphin II.
42 See Tuna-Dolphin para. 3.53
43 See id. para. 3.58.
44See id.
45 See id. para. 5.38.
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environmental treaties, especially those which depend on the use of trade
measures to achieve their objectives. 46 She went on to argue that Tuna-
Dolphin I accorded free trade a "far higher priority than environmental
protection.
4 7
The panel report for Tuna-Dolphin I was never adopted under
GATT guidelines, and in Tuna-Dolphin II, brought by the European
Union, the panel, according to the WTO, modified its position.48 The
panel "recognize[d] for Article XX(g) purposes" that the U.S. action, with
respect to the tuna regulations, was "a policy to conserve exhaustible
natural resources.
' 49
This mixed reading of Article XX of the GATT provided the
foundation for the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel's interpretation of the
four decisions examined in this paper. The first, and arguably one of the
most important, is the Reformulated Gasoline decision.
II. SURVEY
Reformulated Gasoline centered on a regulation enacted under the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 50  The Clean Air Act created two
gasoline programs.5 1 The first was intended to maintain pollution
standards from gasoline below 1990 levels. 52  The second was aimed
specifically at reducing the pollution in designated major population
centers.5 3 "Where the latter program was concerned, only 'reformulated'
gasoline was allowed to be sold."54 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") established specifications to
46 McDonald, supra note 39, at 402.
471 Id. at 438.
48 For an excellent overview of the Tuna-Dolphin dispute, see generally World Trade
Organization, Beyond the agreements: The tuna-dolphin dispute (last modified Feb. 6,
1998) <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/beyond5.htm>.
49 Scott Daniel McBride, Note, Reformulating Executive and Legislative Relationships
after "Reformulated Gasoline:" What's Best for Trade and the Environment?, 23 WM.
& MARY ENVTL L. & POL'Y REv. 299, 310 (1998).
so Air Pollution Control (Clean Air) Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7671(q) (1994); Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives; Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Final Rule, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7715, 7789 (1994).
5' See Jeffrey Waincymer, "Reformulated Gasoline" Under the Reformulated WTO
Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of A Chapeau?, 18 MICH. J. INT'L.
L. 141,146 (1996).
32 See id.
s See id.
14 Id. at 147.
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determine the minimum quality of gasoline allowed in certain cities.55
The dispute stemmed from the fact that domestic refiners had three
different standards that they could use to meet the requirements of the
regulation, whereas foreign refiners had only one.56 "Foreign" refiners are
those that do not export seventy-five percent of their production to the
United States.57
Venezuela filed an early complaint over the regulations under the
GATT in 1994, but dropped it in exchange for the U.S. promise to amend
the regulation. 58 Tension was renewed, however, when Congress blocked
any amendment efforts. 59 Venezuela, and later Brazil, filed complaints
with the Dispute Settlement Body in 1995 alleging that the United States
violated Article XXII:1 of the GATT of 1994, Article 14.1 of the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT Agreement"), and
Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"). 60 The United States defended each of
these claims, relying specifically on the provisions of Article XX(b), (d),
and (g). 61
The Panel found that imported and domestic gasoline were "like
products" and because imported gasoline was denied the same favorable
rules, as domestic gasoline, the regulations violated the United States'
obligations under the GATT.62 Furthermore, the Panel found that
although clean air was an "exhaustible natural resource," 63 the U.S.
regulations were neither "necessary" in the context of Article XX(b) or
"related to" conservation of exhaustible natural resources under Article
XX(g). 64 Following the precedent set earlier in Tuna-Dolphin, the panel
found that the regulation must be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources in order to be upheld under Article XX.65
The decision of the Panel did not surprise many in environmental circles
given the treatment of Article XX in Tuna-Dolphin.66
The U.S. brought an appeal, which was reviewed by the Appellate
" See id. at 146-47.
56 See id. at 147.
17 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 80 - 80.174.
58 See Waincymer, supra note 52, at 147-48.
59 See id. at 148.
60 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 3, paras. 1.1.-1.2.
61 See id. para. 3.58-3.66.
62 Id. para. 6.14.
63 See id. para. 6.37.
6Id. para. 6.39.
65 See id. para. 4.8.
.66 See Myung Hoon Choo, An Institutionalist Perspective on Resolving Trade-
Environmental Conflicts, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 433, 444 (1997).
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Body in April 1996. The appeal by the United States claimed that the
Panel erred by:
1. ruling that the baseline establishment rules do not constitute a
"measure" "relating to" the conservation of air under Article
XX(g); 6 7
2. misapplying Article XX(g);68 and
3. ruling that the baseline establishment rules fail to satisfy the
"necessary" and "primarily aimed at" requirements of Afticle
XX.6
9
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's finding that clean air was an
"exhaustible natural resource. '70 However, it can be safely stated that the
Body took a slightly different interpretation of Article XX. The Panel
used a previous GATT decision, Herring-Salmon,71 to determine that in
order for a regulation to relate to the conservation of an exhaustible natural
resource, it must be primarily aimed at the conservation of that exhaustible
natural resources. 72 Using what the Body called "opaque" reasoning, the
Panel found that, because there was no "direct connection" between the
less favorable baseline establishment rules and the "US objective of
improving air quality," the requirements of Article XX(g)were not met.73
The Body reasoned that the Panel should have looked at whether the
baseline establishment rules were "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, not whether the "less favorable treatment"
of imported gasoline was "primarily aimed at" conservation. 74 "The
chapeau of Article XX makes it clear that it is the 'measures' which are to
be examined under Article XX(g), and not the legal finding of 'less
favourable treatment.' '75  Shifting focus from the "treatment" to the
measures, the Body was able to conclude that the "measures" met the
general requirements of Article XX(g).76 Using the "good faith" standard
67 See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report: United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1 Int'l Trade L. Rep., No.1, at 71 (Apr. 29,
1996) [hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body].68 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 72.
71 Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and-Salmon, B.I.S.D.
35S/98, Mar. 22, 1988.
72 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 3, para. 6.39.
73 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 67, at.75. The Panel found that
the measures fell outside the scope of Article XX(g). See id.
74 See id.
75 Id.76 See id. at 75.
2000)
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
established by the general rules of treaty interpretation,77 the Body found
that the baselines were "primarily aimed at" protecting the environment
and should be viewed as such for Article XX(g) purposes. 78
The last, and arguably most important, segment of the Body's
Article XX(g) analysis centered on the language, "if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." 79 Venezuela argued about the language of XX(g): "to be
properly regarded as 'primarily aimed at' the conservation of natural
resources, the baseline establishment rules must not only 'reflect a
conservation purpose' but also be shown to have had 'some positive
conservation effect.'" 80 The Appellate Body found that this argument was
inconsistent with the "basic international law rule of treaty interpretation"
that gives the terms of a treaty their plain meaning. 8 1
Despite seemingly favorable treatment of the United States'
arguments, the Appellate Body did not find administrative ease sufficient
to justify the differing standards. 82 Furthermore, the Body found that there
were other options available to the U.S. that would be less burdensome on
international trade, i.e. forming "cooperative arrangements with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil" to meet their clean air goals.83 The
EPA's previous attempt to "cut a deal" with Venezuela likely also
contributed to the lack of credibility of the differing standards for "like
products." 84 For these reasons, the Body found that the regulations failed
to meet the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX of the General
agreement, 85 and constituted "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination"
creating a 'disguised restriction' on international trade."86
Reformulated Gasoline provided the foundation for present WTO
Article XX analysis, as can be seen in its progeny.
A. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
17 See id. 76 ("A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.").
78 See id. at 77.79 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 67, at 78.
80 See id. at 78.
8 t See id. at 78.
82 See id. at 81.
83Id. at 82.
84 See Aubry D. Smith, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the
World Trade Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 1267, 1269 (1996).
85 See Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 67, at 82.86 Id. at 80.
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In 1989, the EU banned animals treated with certain hormones
primarily because European consumers thought hormone-treated beef was
unsafe. The United States cattle industry felt that the measures were
taken to protect the European cattle industry. 88 From 1986 to 1989, the
U.S. exported more than $ 250 million worth of beef to the EU members
each year.89 After the ban, U.S. exports to the EU fell to almost zero.
90
In August 1997, the United States, later joined by Canada, filed a
complaint arguing that the EU ban violated its obligations under Article III
or XI of the GATT; the SPS Agreement;91 Article 2 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade;9 and Article 4 of the Agreement on
Agriculture.
9 3
The U.S. argued that the EU ban was a sanitary measure
inconsistent with the SPS Agreement, which ensured that no Member
could use the guise of sanitary or phytosanitary measures to maintain
protectionist barriers to trade.94 Furthermore, it was argued that the ban:
(1) lacked scientific foundation, (2) exceeded the requirement that the ban
apply only to the extent necessary to protect human life and health, and (3)
was more trade restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate level of
sanitary protection.95 The U.S. also argued that the EU ban arbitrarily and
unjustifiably discriminated between Members (of the Agreement) in
87 See Seilheimer, supra note *, at 542 (1998).
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, [hereinafter SPS
Agreement] Annex IA, FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS
INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS
SIGNED ON APRIL 15, 1994, (1994).
92 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, [hereinafter TBT Agreement] Annex IA,
FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15,
1994, (1994).
93 See Complaint by the United States, WT/DS26/R/IUSA, Aug. 18, 1997, at *3, available
in LEXIS, GATIPD; Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, FINAL TEXTS OF THE GATT
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED ON APRIL 15, 1994, (1994).
94 See First Submission of the United States, European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Aug. 28, 1996, para. 88, available in 1996 WL
807619.
95 See id. para. 122.
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identical or similar situations.
.-The EU defended its ban on the grounds that the SPS Agreement
gives the right to establish the level of protection that the Member feels
appropriate. 96  The elevated level of protection with respect to the
hormones was necessary because the use of these hormones may pose
dangers to human and animal health-concerns which have a scientific
basis.9 7 The EU further argued that the EU and U.S. are not similarly
situated because the EU places a greater value on consumer safety than on
commercial interests.
98
The Panel rejected the EU argument that the ban99 should only be
examined under the SPS Agreement if it first violates Article XX(b) of the
GATT. 100 The Panel reasoned that it would be more appropriate to first
review the SPS Agreement and its objectives.' 0'
On appeal, the EU claimed that the Panel failed to adopt a
"deferential 'reasonableness' standard" when reviewing a Member's
decision to adopt a particular science policy or a Member's determination
that a particular inference from the available data is scientifically
plausible. 1
02
, The Appellate Body found that the SPS Agreement does not call
for a .deferential" standard of review, and that the Panel's "objective
assessment of the facts" was appropriate.' 0 3  The Body did reject the
Panel's risk analysis, finding that the risk "is not only risk ascertainable in
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also
.. . the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real
world where people live and work and die."' 0 4  The Panel required a
scientific "probability" of risk to human and animal life and health instead
96 See Hormone Beef, supra note 4, para. 111.6.
97 See First Written Submission of the European Community to the Panel, European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, Sept. 20, 1996, para. 74,
available in 1996 WL 87621. This argument finds foundation in Article XX(b) of the
GATT. Thus, the WTO's treatment of this argument would be similar to Article XX
analysis.
98 See id. para. 134.
99 The Panel only considered meat from cattle, because the U.S.'s original complaint only
dealt with meat and meat products. The WTO decision does not apply to the EU ban on
live cattle.100 See Hormone Beef, supra note 4, para. 8.41.
10 See id. para. 8.42.
102 See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report: EC Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), 2 Int'l Trade L. Rep., No. 4 (Jan. 16, 1996) para.
14 [hereinafter Hormone Beef Appellate Body].
103 See id. para. 119.
104 See id. para. 187.
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of the "possibility" of risk that the EU argued justified the ban.10 5
The Body agreed with the Panel that the EU ban represented a
disguised restriction on international trade. 10 6 The Panel was persuaded
by the U.S. argument that because the EU accepts meat treated with
carbadox, which has similar side-effects as the hormones banned in beef,
the beef ban's true purpose was to protect the domestic cattle market.'
0 7
The Appellate Body did not disagree, finding the inconsistencies
"unjustifiable."'0
B. Australia-Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon
On June 30, 1975, Australia issued the Quarantine Proclamation
86A ("QP86A"), restricting the importation of dead salmon, except such
salmon as "in the opinion of the Director of Quarantine is likely to prevent
the introduction of any infectious or contagious disease, or disease or pest
affecting persons, animals or plants."'
0 9
When Canada requested access to the Australian salmon market,
the Director of Quarantine decided that: "having regard to Australia's
international obligations, importation of uncooked, wild, adult, ocean-
caught Pacific salmonid product from the Pacific rim of North America
should not be permitted on quarantine grounds.""10  In October 1995,
Canada requested consultation over Australia's policies regarding its
salmon."' This led to a meeting on November 24, 1995, but no agreement
was reached."12 Canada felt that Australia's cited health concerns were
not grounded in scientific evidence. 1 3 The "Final Report" of Australia's
risk analysis of the quarantine noted that:
"o5 See id. para. 184.
106 See Hormone Beef, supra note 4, para. 8.216.
107 See id. para. 8.243.
1o See Hormone BeefAppellate Body, supra note 102, para. 235. "[T]he decision will act
as a strong disincentive against the arbitrary application of SPS measures justified on
health grounds that are actually based on politics or public opinion." Rufus H. Yerxa &
Demetrios J. Marantis, Assessing the New WTO Dispute System: A U.S. Perspective, 32
INT'L LAW. 795, 800 (1998).
109 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report: Australia-Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, Oct. 20, 1998 at para. 2, available in 1998 WL 731009
thereinafter Australia-Salmon Appellate Body].
10 AQIS, File Note by Paul Hickey, Executive Director, 13 December 1996 (the "1996
decision").
111 See Australia-Salmon, supra note 5, para. 1.1.
112 See id. para. 1.2.
113 See id. para. 1.1.
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there was a possibility that up to 20 disease agents exotic to
Australia might be present in Pacific salmon products and
although the probability of establishment would be low,
there would be major economic impacts which could
seriously threaten the viability of aquacultural operations
and the recreational fishing industries, in addition to
adverse environmental impacts .on the built environment of
Australia. . . .[S]hould any of the 20 diseases become
established, they would almostcertainly be ineradicable." 4
Australia also noted that the conclusions of the Report would be reviewed
when scientific knowledge advanced." 5 Canada was not satisfied with
this response, and brought a claim with the Dispute Resolution Panel."l 6
Canada claimed that the Australian "measure was an illegal import
prohibition under Article XI: 1 of GATT 1994 that found no justification in
Article XI:2 or Article XX of GATT 1994." l"1 In response, Australia
claimed that Canada failed to meet the evidentiary burden necessary to
raise a presumption that Australia's regulation was inconsistent with the
GATT."' Furthermore, Australia claimed that the regulation conformed
with the requirements of the SPS Agreement, and thus should be presumed
to be in accordance with provisions within GATT 1994 regarding the use
of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, particularly the provisions in
Article XX(b). "
The Panel found that Australia, by maintaining a sanitary measure
which is not based on a risk assessment, acted (both insofar as the measure
applies to salmon products at issue from adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific
salmon and the other categories of salmon products in dispute)
inconsistently with the requirements contained in Articles 2.2 and 5.1 of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(the Agreement). 120
The Panel also ruled that Australia adopted arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in the levels of sanitary protection it considered
to be appropriate in different situations (on the one hand the salmon
products at issue from adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon and, on
114 Id. para. 2.30. Australia agreed to perform this risk analysis following GATT Article
XXII consultations in 1994. See id. para. 2.27.
"' See id. para. 2.30.
116 See Australia-Salmon, supra note 5, para. 1.3.
117 See id. para. 3.1.
11 8 See id. para. 3.5.
119 See id. para. 3.5.
120 See id. para. 8.151.
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the other hand, herring in whole, frozen form for use as bait and live
ornamental finfish), which result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade, violating Articles 2.3 and 5.5 of the
Agreement.' 21  Finally, Australia maintained a sanitary measure (with
respect to those salmon products at issue from adult, wild, ocean-caught
Pacific salmon) which is more trade-restrictive than required to achieve its
appropriate. level of sanitary protection, violating Article 5.6, of the
Agreement. 122 Australia appealed the Panel's decision, and the Appellate
Body handed its decision down on October 20, 1998.
The Body first rejected the Panel's position that, with respect to the
requirements of 5.1, the import prohibition on "fresh, chilled, or frozen"
salmon and the heat treatment as "two sides of a single coin. ' 123 The
Panel felt that a consequence of Australia's sanitary requirement that
salmon be heat-treated before it can be imported is that imports of fresh,
chilled, or frozen salmon are prohibited. 124 Due to this finding, the Body
found that "the SPS measure at issue in this dispute is the import
prohibition on fresh, chilled or frozen salmon set forth in QP86A, as
confirmed by the 1996 Decision, rather than the heat-treatment
requirement .... ,, 25
Due to the Body's determination that the Panel examined the
wrong measure, it was forced to do its own analysis to determine whether
Australia's actions were consistent with Article 5.1.126 The Body did
agree with the Panel's determination that the risk assessment must be:
121 See id. para. 8.160. The requirements of Articles 2.3 and 5.5 are provided below:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do
not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where
identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own
territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade.
Id. para. 4.89 (quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 91, at art. 2.3).
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or
health, each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions
in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such
distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade ....
Id. para. 4.171 (quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 91, at art. 5.5).
122 See Australia-Salmon, supra note 5, para. 8.185.
123 Australia-Salmon Appellate Body, supra note 109, para. 101.
124 See Australia-Salmon, supra note 5, para. 8.86.
12s Australia-Salmon Appellate Body, supra note 109, para. 105.
126See id. para. 119.
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"[tihe evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a
pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member according to
the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied, and of the
associated potential biological and economic consequences. ,,127
Referring to the Hormone-Beef decision, the Body reemphasized that a
proper risk assessment evaluates the "likelihood" of entry, not the fact that
there is a possibility of entry, as the Australian Final report concluded .
28
As stated before in Hormone-Beef, there is no quantitative requirement
of risk. 129 Thus, the Body found "that the 1996 Final Report is not a
proper risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 . . . "making it
impossible for Australia to meet its obligation under Article 5.1.130
With respect to the differing standards of protection between the
salmon products at issue--adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon-and
herring in whole, frozen form for use as bait and live ornamental finfish,
the Body upheld the Panel's findings.' 31  The Body found this
differentiation to be "arbitrary or unjustifiable," and a "disguised
restriction on international trade."'
132
The Appellate Body in Australia-Salmon was very consistent in
both its methodology and its aggressive defense of international trade. In
the eyes of both Bodies, the fatal flaw of both measures was the
inconsistency in levels of protection between like hormones in one case, 133
and like products in the other.'
34
12 7 Id. para. 120.
'28 See id. There is basically a three-pronged test:
(1) The assessment must "identify the diseases whose entry,
establishment or spread a Member [Australia] wants to prevent
within its territory, as well as the potential biological and economic
consequences associated with the entry, establishment or spread of
these diseases;"
(2) The assessment must "evaluate the likelihood of entry,
establishment or spread of these diseases as well as the associated
potential biological and economic consequences;" and
(3) The assessment must "evaluate the likelihood of entry,
establishment or spread of these diseases according to the SPS
measures which might be applied."
Id. para 121. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body found that the 1996 Final Report
failed both the second and third prongs of the test. See Australia-Salmon, supra note 5,
para. 8.99; Australia-Salmon Appellate Body, supra note 109, at para. 128.
9 See Australia-Salmon Appellate Body, supra note 109, para. 123.
130 Id. paras. 135-36.
131 See id. para. 177.
132 Id. paras. 157, 159.
133 See Hormone Beef, supra note 4, at para. 11.3.
134 See Australia-Salmon Appellate Body, supra note 109, at para. 104.
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The WTO did not depart from this vigorous protectionism in
Shrimp-Turtle. In fact, together with Reformulated Gasoline, Shrimp-
Turtle is likely the most important environmental decision handed down
by the WTO.
C. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and -Shrimp
Products
The regulations at issue in Shrimp-Turtle are the result of a
Congressional mandate under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") of
1973.135 The language of the statute.expresses Congress' intent to protect
endangered species and also requires the help of all federal agencies in this
endeavor.
In order to carry out obligations under the ESA, several agencies
issued regulations requiring shrimp fishermen to use turtle excluder
devices ("TED"s).136 These regulations only applied to parties fishing for
shrimp off the coast of the United States.
137
Realizing that measures to protect sea turtles would only be
effective if applied on a broader scale, in 1990 Congress passed the
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act.' 38 Section 609 of the Act required, inpart,
that the Secretaries of State and Commerce enter into "bilateral or
multilateral agreements with foreign countries" to protect and conserve the
endangered species of sea turtles.' 39 The law also prohibited the
importation of shrimp or shrimp products that had been harvested in a way
adverse to the survival of species of sea turtles prior to May 1, 1991.140
In 1991, the Department of State issued guidelines to bring foreign
shrimp operators into line with Section 609.141 These guidelines were
135 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)136 The agencies were the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and National Marine Fisheries Service. See Sea Turtle Conservation;
Shrimp Trawling Requirements, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,244 (1987).
137 See id. at 24,247.
131 Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 1037 (1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)).
139 § 609(a)(1).
140 See § 609(b)(1).
141 See Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations Protection; Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg.
1051 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Guidelines]. In order to be certified as having a
comparable regulatory program, the foreign nation would be required to document
evidence of a program including the following:
1. No Retention-a prohibition on the retention of incidentally caught
sea turtles.
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limitedto the wider Caribbean/Atlantic region.' 42 Under these regulations,
vessels smaller than twenty-five feet could use restricted tow times instead
of TEDs.' 43  However, in 1992, the National Marine Fisheries Service
("NMFS") issued new regulations for the U.S. domestic conservation
program, to be administered by itself and other agencies. 144 Included in
the regulations was a provision eliminating the "small vessel. exemption"
for the use of TEDs after 1993.'14
In 1993, the Department of State revised its own guidelines to
2. Resuscitation-a requirement that comatose incidentally caught
sea turtles be resuscitated.
3. Reduction of incidental taking. At the time of requesting an initial
positive determination, many affected nations may not have data
on the incidental taking of sea turtle in their shrimp trawl fishery.
This element will therefore be satisfied if there is either:
(a) A commitment to require all shrimp trawl vessels to use TEDs
at all times (or reduce tow times if a vessel is under 25 feet).
This requirement may be phased in over a period of not more
than three years. The program description should establish a
timetable during which TEDs use will be phased in; or
(b) A commitment to engage in a statistically reliable and
verifiable scientific program to determine times and areas of
turtle abundance and assess the impact of the shrimp trawl
fishery on sea turtles; to develop and assess technologies to
reduce the impact of the shrimp trawl fishery on sea turtles;
and to require the use of fishing technologies and techniques
that will reduce the incidental mortality of sea turtles in the
shrimp trawl fishery to insignificant levels. A program will be
found comparable if it contains these elements and if the
period of assessment and implementation is not more than
three years. The program description should establish a
timetable by which each phase of the program is to be
completed.
4. Enforcement. To be comparable, a program must include a
credible enforcement effort that includes monitoring for
compliance and appropriate sanctions.
Id. See also Terrence P. Stewart & Mara M. Burr, Trade and Domestic Protection of
Endangered Species: Peaceful Coexistence or Continued Conflict? The Shrimp-Turtle
Dispute and the World Trade Organization, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
109, 116 (1998) (discussing the 1991 Guidelines).
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 See Threatened Fish and Wildlife; Threatened Marine Reptiles; Revisions to Enhance
and Facilitate Compliance With Sea Turtle Conservation Requirements Applicable to
Shrimp Trawlers; Restrictions Applicable to Shrimp Trawls and Other Fisheries, 57 Fed.
Reg. 57,348 (1992).
145 See id.
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bring them in line with those of NMFS. 14 6 Under these 1993 Guidelines,
certification for foreign shrimp operators would depend on their use of
TEDs in all areas and at all times. 147 Not only must affected nations
require that TEDs be used at all times, 4 8 their respective programs must
also contain enforcement provisions to compel compliance.
As a result of an order from the Court of International Trade, 50 in
1996 the Department of State was forced to issue new guidelines that
would enforce Section 609 on a worldwide basis. 15 1 Beginning on May 1,
1996 all shipments of shrimp and shrimp products into the U.S. were
required to have a declaration that the shrimp was harvested in a manner
that did not adversely affect sea turtles.' 52 The most important change to
the guidelines was that the area of enforcement was expanded to include
146 See Revised Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs for the
Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 9015, 9016
(1993) [hereinafter 1993 Guidelines]. "With the limited exemptions noted below,
beginning January 1, 1993, all U.S. commercial shrimp trawl vessels in the waters of the
Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean from North Carolina to Texas must use TEDs at
all times in all areas." Id.
147 See id.
148 See id. at 9017.
149 See id.
150 See Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 913 F.Supp. 559 (Ct. Int'l. Trade 1995) (holding
that Endangered Species Act provisions are without geographic boundary and that global
enforcement is mandatory despite potential conflicts with GATI').
151 See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign Programs
for the Protection of Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,342-43
(1996) [hereinafter 1996 Guidelines]. These new guidelines provided:
Shrimp Harvested in a Manner Not Harmful to Sea Turtles. The
Department of State has determined that import prohibitions imposed
pursuant to Section 609 do not apply to shrimp or products of shrimp
harvested under the following conditions, since such harvesting does
not adversely affect sea turtles:
a. Shrimp harvested in an aquaculture facility in which the shrimp
spend at least 30 days in ponds prior to being harvested.
b. Shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawl vessels using TEDs
comparable in effectiveness to those required in the United States.
c. Shrimp harvested exclusively by means that do not involve the
retrieval of fishing nets by mechanical devices or by vessels using
gear that, in accordance with the U.S. Program described above,
would not require TEDs.
d. Species of shrimp, such as the pandalid species, harvested in areas
in which sea turtles do not occur.
Id.
152 See id.
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those countries that later filed a complaint with the WTO."53
India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand charged that the U.S.
regulations were inconsistent with the United States' obligations under
Articles I:1, XI:1, and XIII:1, of the 1994 GATT, and, furthermore, were
not justified by the exceptions in Article XX.15 4
The Panel convened to rule on the dispute and found the following:
(1) The import ban on shrimp and shrimp products from non-certified
countries violated Article XI: 1.1 "
(2) A violation of Articles XIII: I and :1 need not be examined
because of the determination under Article XI: 1.156
The remaining issue before the panel was, "whether Article XX(b)
and (g) apply at all when a Member has taken a measure conditioning
access to its market for a given product on the adoption of certain
conservation policies by the exporting Member(s).' ' 7 In order to
determine the issue, the Panel analyzed the regulation against the chapeau
of Article XX. Although the Panel stated that Article XX is to be
interpreted broadly,15 8 the Panel went on to state that: Members are only
allowed to deviate from the requirements of the 1994 GATT as long as
their actions do not undermine the multilateral trading system.159 The new
test was articulated as follows:
[W]hen considering a measure under Article XX, we must
determine not only whether the measure on its own
undermines the WTO multilateral trading system, but also
whether such type of measure, if it were to be adopted by
other Members, would threaten the security and
predictability of the multilateral trading system.16
0
153 By extending the area of enforcement beyond the Caribbean/Atlantic region, Section
609 lost the illusion of domestic environmental policy and looked more like
extraterritorial environmental enforcement.
154 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 6, para. 7.22.
155 See id. para. 7.13.
156 See id. para. 7.22.
' Id. para. 7.26.
1s8 See id. "We [Shrimp-Turtle Panel] note that Article XX can accommodate a broad
range of measures aiming at the conservation and preservation of the environment. At
the same- time, by accepting the WTO Agreement, Members commit themselves to
certain obligations which limit their right to adopt certain measures ... ." Shrimp-Turtle,
supra note 6, para. 7.26.
I9 See id. para. 7.44.
160 id.
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The "threat to the multilateral trading system"' 61 standard had not been
used in the previous environmental decisions. The Panel's interpretation
of the measure in light of the chapeau is different from that of the Panel in
Reformulated Gasoline.162 Past Panels tried to fit the measure into one of
the specific exceptions first, before determining if the measure was
applied in a non-discriminatory manner as required by the chapeau of
Article XX.163 However, the Shrimp Turtle Panel found that, according to
Section 609, the United States' policy of conditioning access to its markets
based on other Members' adoption of certain conservation policies
constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" between countries that export
"like products," and was therefore not protected by Article XX.164
The Shrimp-Turtle Dispute came before the Appellate Body in
October of 1996.165 As a threshold matter, the Body ruled that the Panel's
legal analysis was in error, and reversed the ruling. 166 The Body then
proceeded with its own legal analysis, stating: "As in th[e] previous cases,
we believe it is our responsibility here to examine the claim by the United
States for justification of Section 609 under Article XX in order to
properly resolve this dispute.' ' 167 The Body invoked a two-tiered analysis
as first established in Reformulated Gasoline:
(1) First, determine if the measure fits one of the exceptions of Article
XX (in these cases, XX(b) or (g));168
(2) Second, examine the measure against the requirements of the
"chapeau" of Article XX. 1
69
Citing the standards set forth in Reformulated Gasoline for the first
tier, the Body found that turtles were an "exhaustible natural resource"
under Article XX(g), and the law was an "even-handed" measure. 170 The
Body then applied the three standards of the chapeau. It is in this area
161 Id. para. 7.61.
162 See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 3.
163 See id. para. 4.8.
164 See Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 6, para. 7.49.
165 See id. para. 1.
166 See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 3 Int'l Trade L. Rep., No.5 ( Jan. 16, 1996) at para. 1.23 (W.T.O.)
[hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body]. The Appellate Body ruled this way because
the Shrimp-Turtle Panel did not adhere to the standards of Article XX analysis, as
established in Reformulated Gasoline. See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 3, paras.
6.20, 6.30, 6.35.
167 Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body, supra note 166, para. 124.
168 See id. para. 125.
169 See id. para. 147.
170 Id. para. 143.
71 See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text (listing the three standards).
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of the analysis where Section 609 faltered under the Body's scrutiny.
Due to the United States' refusal to accept shrimp caught using
TEDs from countries that were not certified by the United States, the Body
found the measures were applied in a manner that constituted "arbitrary"
and "unjustified discrimination" under the chapeau. In its application,
the Body found Section 609 to be, "in effect, an economic embargo which
requires all other exporting members ... to adopt essentially the same
policy as that applied to, and enforced on, United States domestic shrimp
trawlers."1
73
Although the Body ruled against the United States and ordered that
it bring Section 609 in compliance with its obligations under the GATT,
the Body painstakingly pointed out that they did not rule that "the
protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance to
Members of the WTO."' 74  In their words, "as we emphasized in
[Reformulated-Gasoline], WTO Members are free to adopt their own
policies aimed at protecting the environment as long as, in so doing, they
fulfill their obligations and respect the rights of other Members under the
WTO Agreement.'
175
III. WHERE ARE WE Now?
The fact that the Appellate Body in Shrimp-Turtle repeatedly
affirmed the language in Reformulated Gasoline seems to be an attempt by
the WTO to establish some continuity in evaluating environmental
measures. Exactly when an environmentally protective measure will be
acceptable under the WTO is unclear. Some language in the Appellate
Body Report of Shrimp-Turtle suggests that a measure would only be
acceptable if it is the result of a multilateral effort that several countries
agree to uphold. 76 What is clear is that the process first established in
Reformulated Gasoline, and reaffirmed in Shrimp-Turtle, will serve as the
hoop that any country must guide its environmental laws through if its
justification is rooted in Article XX of the GATT. If this is not
accomplished, then the measure fails outright under an Article XX
defense. In order to fall under Article XX(g), and perhaps XX(b), the
measure must be "primarily aimed at" a conservation purpose, 177 or
172 See id. para. 184.
173 Trade: WTO Upholds Ruling that U.S. Restrictions Linked to Sea Turtles Violate
Trade Rules, 199 DEN A-3, October 15, 1998.
174 Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body, supra note 166, para. 185.
171 Id. para. 186.
176 See id. para. 185.
177 Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body, supra note 67, at 77.
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protecting human, animal, plant, etc., health.178  The law is then tested
against.the introductory language of Article XX, commonly referred to as
the chapeau. 79  There are three benchmarks that an environmental
measure must clear under the chapeau:
(a) the measure must not arbitrarily discriminate between countries
where the same conditions prevail;'
8 0
(b) the measure must not unjustifiably discriminate between countries
where the same conditions prevail;18 1 and
(c) the measure must not be a disguised restriction on international
trade. '8
2
Unless all three of these conditions are met, the law fails under the
chapeau and the offending country is instructed to set the law aside.
The Panel in Shrimp-Turtle hypothesized that if other countries
adopted measures similar to Section 609, the multilateral trading system
would break down.'8 3  The Body in Shrimp-Turtle did not adopt the
Panel's "threat to the multilateral trading system" standard, 8 4 but it seems
to be the unspoken rule in all four cases. Critics in certain environmental
circles worry it is unlikely that the WTO will be able to meaningfully
balance environmental and trade concerns.l15
A. Contributing Nations
One of the biggest problems that contributing to the inherent
tension between the desire to promote international trade and
environmental protection is the fact that not all nations are similarly
situated. The richer, or "more developed" nations are usually more
concerned with environmental protection than what are considered
"developing" nations.1 8 6  This has been referred to as the "Us-Them"
among nation states.
1 8 7
'
78 See Hormone Beef Appellate Body, supra note 102, para. 102.
See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body, supra note 166, para. 150.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
193 See id. para. 7.44.
184 Shrimp-Turtle, supra note 6, para. 7.44.
183 See Layla Hughes, Limiting the Jurisdiction of Dispute Settlement Panels, The WTO
Appellate Body Hormone Beef Decision, 10 GEo. INT'L. ENVTL. L. REV. 915, 934
(1998).
186 See Joshua R. Flourn, Defending Dolphins and Sea Turtles: On the Front Lines in an
"Us-Them" Dialectic, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 943, 944 (1998).
187 See ESTY, supra note 8, at 181-83.
2000]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
The "Us-Them" dialectic between developing and
developed countries is manifested doctrinally by the split
between proponents of tariffs and proponents of treaties.
The former believe that it is precisely a wealthy nation's
market power that can be most effective at saving an
endangered species from extinction ... The unilateral use of
market coercion, however, is subject to charges of
"environmental imperialism" by developing nations. 8 8
Such coercions also offend both those who feel that multilateralism is the
most effective mode of governance and economists who point to the
increased aggregate global wealth with the removal of trade barriers. 189
The arguable abandonment of meaningful environmental protection in the
above decisions in favor of increased international trade is the same
"parade of horribles" many environmental organizations opposed to the
judicial authority vested in trade organization like the WTO foresaw.' 90
Some environmentalists, sometimes called environmental isolationists,
feel that "[t]he WTO is incompatible with environmental protection and
should be disbanded."'191
Still others argue that the WTO and the multilateral system are
among the most effective tools available to implement a global approach
to environmental protection. 192  It has even been suggested that the
decisions discussed in this paper are only "seemingly" anti-environment.
"[These] decisions may actually further the environmental cause by
bringing attention to the need for an enhanced multinational approach to
international environmental rules."'193 The argument is that the publicity
that these decisions generate provides a most powerful means to advance
the law. 194  Countries will realize that the multilateral approach to
environmental is the most desirable approach, and act accordingly.
B. WTO as Global Green Police?
's Floum, supra note 186, at 947-48.
189 See id. at 948.
190 See id. at 949.
'9' Andrew L. Strauss, From Gattzilla to the Green Giant: Winning the Environmental
Battle for the Soul of the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 769,
770 (1998).
192 See Ronald A. Brand, Sustaining the Development of International Trade and
Environmental Law, 21 VT. L. REv. 823, 845 (1997).
193 Id.
194 See id.
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Is it the proper place for organizations like the WTO to control
how and when a nation implements environmental protection? 95  One
author argues that the WTO, by necessity, must play an aggressive role in
"global environmental protection."' 96 Even if the multilateral approach is
the "best" way, the critical "Us-Them" problem is not solved. "As trade
increases, the incentives for creating competitive advantages also . . .
increase, bringing with them the fear that states will adopt lower
environmental standards in order to attract industry."', 97 The two main
arguments of this school of thought are: first, "[t]he emergence of global
environmental problems such as ozone depletion and global warming, and
the growing realization that the global environment is in a general sense
ecologically interconnected, has made the need for global environmental
regulation increasingly clear."' 198 Given the interconnectedness of the
environment, the efforts of a few "environmentally minded" nations
toward environmental protection are futile in the face of mass apathy or
opposition from the rest of the world.
Second, environmental protection is entirely the role of the WTO
and consistent with its "overall trade mission."'
199
[O]ne of the primary purposes of the WTO is to create a
level playing field upon which international trade can take
place. As is well known, this playing field can become
uneven when some countries provide domestic producers
with a competitive advantage over foreign producers by
establishing relatively lax environmental standards.
Assigning the [WTO] the task of eliminating this
competitive advantage through oversight of global
environmental standards is well within the overall trade
195 Although organizations such as the WTO have obvious benefits, the necessary
relinquishing of sovereignty by poor nation-states is too high a price. With the
incalculable differences among the peoples and nations of the world and their respective
philosophies and needs, it is impossible for all nations to agree on how to move forward
in areas like the environment where all parties are not similarly situated. For the many
abjectly poor nations, environmental protection may be seen as a luxury they can ill
afford. The fact of the matter is that the majority of the nations are not as well off as the
U.S. or the EU. Why should the U.S. and the EU have their efforts to protect the
environment restrained by this fact?
196 Strauss, supra note 32, at 309.
197 Brand, supra note 192, at 838.
198 Strauss, supra note 32, at 311. Although Strauss is wary of possible threats to national
sovereignty that the WTO as global environmental regulator would pose, he argues the
WTO should take a unique leadership role in global environmental initiatives.
'99Id. at 312.
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mandate of the WTO.2 °°
The "lax environmental standards as unfair trade practice"
argument provides an interesting riposte to the traditional "environmental
regulation as unfair restraint on trade" argument that is the familiar
rallying cry of developing nations and their friends in business.20 1
Even accepting the arguments above as the foundation for the
WTO's role in environmental regulation, the issue of enforcement
becomes critical. Any student of international law knows that aside from
a tradition of deference, there are no concrete legislative mechanisms in
existence to enforce international regulation.20 2 The WTO's current
methods of enforcement are capable enough.20 3 An immediate incentive
for joining a WTO-led move toward environmental protection is the
possible loss of the obvious benefits that nations receive in
participation. 204  Membership most certainly has its privileges, and the
possible loss of those privileges will be enough to persuade most nations
to join the environmental protection effort. Furthermore, the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) allows a winning party in a dispute to
seek permission from the WTO to withdraw trade concessions previously
200 Id. at 312-13.
201 Others say that the later argument rests on the false assumption that "a preference for
degrading the local environment should be seen as a low cost factor of economic
production." Strauss, supra note 191, at 793. The costs of such a preference will have to
be borne by the local population "whose quality of life the pollution adversely affects."
See id. Nevertheless, Strauss would venture to say that when given a choice between
feeding their families or protecting the environment, there is no choice. There is
probably a direct correlation between the intensity of feeling for environmental protection
and the fullness of one's belly.
202 See Strauss, supra note 32, at 320.
203 See id.
204 See id. at 317-18.
Most favored nation [MFN] treatment . . . assure[s] nations "C" and
"D" that if nation "A," a GATT participant, granted a certain reduction
of tariffs to nation "B," also a GATT participant, "C" and "D" as
GATT participants would be entitled to the same treatment as "B,"
without having to provide any benefits in return. In addition, once B's,
C's, or D's goods had been imported into "A," they had to be treated in
the same manner as domestically produced goods. This is the principle
of "national treatment" which introduce[s] an additional measure of
equality and fairness. For not only [is] it necessary to treat the goods of
other nations as favorably as those of the most favored nation, but once
the goods... ente[r]... a member's territory, these goods ha[ve] to be
treated as if they were the importing member nation's own goods.
Boris Kozolchyk, NAFTA in the Grand and Small Scheme of Things, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 135, 137-38 (1996).
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given to the offending party if the offending party refuses to compensate
the "winner." 20 5  "These can be very costly, and can be strategically
targeted against specific politically powerful national industries of the
,,206
recalcitrant parties.
Even if the multilateral approach is the "best" way, without using
the "lax environmental standards as unfair trade practice" standard to
prohibit a "race to the bottom," the critical "Us-Them" problem is not
solved. Present conditions show: "[a]s trade increases, the incentives for
creating competitive advantages (rather than pure comparative
advantages) also increase, bringing with them the fear that States will
adopt lower environmental standards in order to attract industry. ' 20 7 Even
though multinational companies may bring technologies that will improve
environmental practices in some of the developing countries,20 8 if profit
maximization is the goal, how logical is it to bring to developing nations
the very same expensive environmental standards one is attempting to
escape? The WTO decisions do not seem to provide any incentives to
developing countries or the industries they are attempting to attract to
make environmental protection a priority.
Although commentators such as Daniel Esty suggest replacing the
current Article XX analysis with something more environmentally
friendly,20 9 and others propose removing environmental conflict from the
WTO/GATT regime to the United Nation Environmental Programme
(UNEP), 21 neither is necessary. First, if one endorses the belief thatinternational trade and global environmental protection are opposite sides
205 See Strauss, supra note 32, at 324. "As the largest trading partner of most WTO
members, the United States simply has more credibility when it threatens sanctions."
Yerxa, supra note 108, at 809.
206 Strauss, supra note 32, at 325.
Thus, in addition to facing international pressures to comply with
environmental treaty obligations, the system is designed so that
targeted industries place additional internal pressures on their
governments to comply. Because such sanctions are legalized, and
therefore deemed legitimate, the loser is unlikely to retaliate in kind,
thus averting the potential for a trade war.
Id.
207 Brand, supra note 192, at 838.
201 See id.
209 Esty proposes replacing the Article XX analysis with a test that weighs competing
trade and environment claims based on the following three factors: (1) intent and effect of
the challenged regulations; (2) the legitimacy of the underlying environmental injury; and
(3) the justification for the disruption of trade. See id. at 114-30.
210 See id.
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of the same coin, 211 the policies driving both should be formulated and
coordinated by the same body in order to pursue the notion of balance
between trade liberalization and responsible environmental stewardship.
Second, keeping environmental regulation and international trade together
makes -sense from an efficiency standpoint. The WTO's Dispute
Settlement system was designed to handle disputes as expeditiously. as
possible,212 and both the issues, and politics behind the issues, are
complicated enough with. the involvement of just one bureaucracy. The
connection between the environment and international trade remains,
therefore inserting another body into the equation would result in
unnecessary delay and confusion.
The pieces are already in place to implement environmental
protection on a global scale. There is no need to tinker with Article XX,
because the failure is not in the language. The only failure is that the
WTO refuses to give the language any effect.
C. Language of Article XX-Clauses (b), (g), and Chapeau
The language of Article XX provides the legal foundation for
protecting a nation-state's environmental initiatives provided that the
WTO chooses to embrace such action. Given the Article XX exemption,
the GATT Secretariat stated in 1992 that: "'GATT rules, therefore, place
essentially no constraints on a country's right to protect its own
environment against damage from either domestic production or the
consumption of domestically produced or imported products.' 213 Article
XX is an exception to general obligations under the GATT, so if the
language is given the strength that the WTO's promoters promised it
would, environmental interests may be advanced within the multilateral
trading system.
As a preliminary matter, the case history indicates that it is not
especially difficult for an environmental regulation to meet the
2Y1 See Brand, supra note 192, at 838 (generally discussing the effect that trade measures
and environmental regulation have on each other and the real or imagined environmental
implications of trade.)
212 The target time frame for dispute settlement is one year and three months with an
appeal. See World Trade Organization, The WTO's 'most individual contribution'
(visited Mar. 8, 1999) <www.wto.org/wto/about/disputel.htn#panel>. The WTO
website gives an overview of the role of the WTO in dispute resolution, and provides an
estimated time schedule.
213 Steve Chamovitz, Environment and Health Under WTO Dispute Settlement, 32 INT'L
LAW. 901, 902 (1998) (quoting 1 INT'L TRADE 1990-91 at 23 (General Agreement'on
Tariffs and Trade, 1992)).
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requirements of clause (g). 214 Under current WTO jurisprudence, it is a
comparatively easier task to justify a measure as "necessary to protect
human, plant, or animal life," or as "necessary to protect an exhaustible
natural resource," 21 5 than it is to justify a measure under the chapeau.
The WTO's interpretation of the chapeau's language provides the
greatest hurdle for environmental regulations challenged before the
WTO.216 The language of the chapeau prohibits the application of a
measure in any way that constitutes "unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade."217  Since the language gives no indication what
exactly constitutes "unjustifiable discrimination," the standard is what the
Appellate Body says it is. 218 Given the current application of the chapeau,
"there would seem to be little basis for the conclusion that GATT rules
place essentially no constraints on a country's right to protect its own
environment." 2
19
While it is certainly possible to use environmental regulation as a
guise for protecting domestic markets, this is certainly not the case in
every instance. The Panel or Appellate Body should be quite capable of
discerning the intent behind an environmental measure, and scientific
evidence is already required to meet the requirements of clauses XX(b)
and XX(g).22° In the final analysis, the WTO must accept that in certain
circumstances, environmental protection is a legitimate barrier to some
trade objectives. If the environment truly has legitimacy as a reason for
excepting a nation from fulfilling certain GATT obligations, then such
measures will only fail to meet the language of the chapeau if their
purpose is not actually environmental protection, but something else.
..4 See Shrimp-Turtle Appellate Body, supra note 166, para. 143; Reformulated Gasoline
Appellate Body, supra note 67, at 71; Charnovitz, supra note 213, at 912.
2 5 GATT Art. XX(b), (g).
216 Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any
contracting party of measures.
Id.217 id.
218 According to Chamovitz, "[t]he Appellate Body has shown a willingness to invent
new requirements for the [chapeau] that do not exist in the text and to apply them
arbitrarily." Charnovitz, supra note 213, at 912.219 id.220 See Shrimp- Turtle Appellate Body, supra note 166, para. 141; Reformulated Gasoline
Appellate Body, supra note 67, at 71.
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D. Endorsing the WTO's Environmental Role
At this point it would be detrimental to furthering the
environmental cause if disputes were removed from the multilateral
trading framework. It is only logical to keep the two together.221 Pursuit
of maximizing global wealth must necessarily include a cleaner
environment. Making the leap between the WTO's present environmental
approach and a meaningful absorption of environmental protection in
trade development is not as difficult as it seems.222 The paradox lies in
that forming a real partnership between environmental and trade concerns
is both easy and so hard as to seem insurmountable. The ease is the fact
that, as stated before, the pieces are already in place and the WTO is the
logical tool. 223 The seemingly insurmountable difficulty is that in order to
form this partnership, the WTO will have to make a fundamental change
in how it views the place of environmental protection in international
trade. Developing nations adverse to greater environmental initiatives
have worked, and will continue to work diligently through the Committee
on Trade and Environment ("CTE") to stymie any attempts to change the
status quo. 224 While the necessity of such change is obvious to this author,
the WTO faces a complex situation. While it is important to loosen the
stranglehold that less environmentally concerned nations have on the CTE
and domestic environmental policy, the WTO must still work to avoid the
very same tragedies that led to the forming of the WTO in the first
place.225
Despite the foreseen dangers in such a change in policy, the
WTO's perceived aggressiveness against domestic environmental
protection in order to preserve the multilateral trading system might in the
end be counterproductive. There is a danger that countries that put a
priority on meaningful environmental protection may start to ignore the
221 See generally Brand, supra note 192, at 861.
222 See id. at 851.
223 See id.
224 See Strauss, supra note 32, at 318.
225 See ESTY, supra note 8, at 243. Some fear that a breakdown of international trade
relations may lead the world to repeat the mistakes of the past. This concern is a bit
overblown. The world is a different place, and given the interconnectedness of the
world's economy, the fear of a trade war may be something of a "strawman." Moreover,
the United States is in a unique position with respect to trade, given that it is an important
trade partner for the rest of the world. If the U.S. takes a more aggressive stance toward
domestic environmental protection when faced with a challenge from the WTO, the
WTO will blink first.
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WTO's rulings with respect to their efforts. The U.S. has yet to comply
with Shrimp-Turtle and cannot say when it will.226 The WTO may kill the
"golden goose" in their haste to protect it.
IV. CONCLUSION
As one surveys the latest environmental decisions and sees in the
language a departure from Tuna-Dolphin, the growth in positive language
regarding the validity of Article XX should bring optimism. The future of
environmental protection under the WTO is still up in the air; but recent
decisions have opened the door for increased recognition of environmental
protection goals.
Although there may be set tests against which environmental laws
may be measured, the present landscape shows the credibility of Article
XX is largely in the minds of its drafters. Despite what environmental
circles might consider progress in the ability to meet the bar provided by
clauses (b) and (g), the WTO doggedly maintains an interpretation of the
chapeau that renders any progress with clauses (b) and (g) practically
useless. The WTO's record shows more lipservice than commitment
when it comes to balancing environmental protection with international
trade.
The time seems ripe for bringing things to a head concerning the
ability to implement environmental regulations that may affect
international trade. In order to force a more environmentally friendly
interpretation of Article XX, one of the member countries, particularly the
United States or the European Union, may have to start ignoring the
WTO's decisions. The WTO could not continue to exist without the full
support of its most important Members, especially the United States, given
the reliance of the rest of the world on the U.S. economy. Such an action
would force the WTO to deal squarely with the future of global
environmental protection.
226 See Daniel Pruzin, Trade: U.S. Says it will Comply with Ruling in Shrimp-Turtle, but
Fails to Say When, 230 DAILY ENV'T REP., Dec. 1, 1998, at A-2.
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